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Ubuqhophololo bokudlulisa ucingo, ubuqhophololo be-invoyisi, kunye nokukhumbula ibhanki yeFFKC

Amanani kaxakeka ayohluka ngokwamazwe. Eli phepha lisebenzisa u-911, inani laseMelika naseKhanada. Amanye amazwe amaninzi asebenzisa i-112, 999, okanye elinye inani. Fumana inombolo yelizwe lakho.

Ukufumanisa ukuba inkampani yakho, umthengi wezindlu nezindlu, umbutho ongenzi nzuzo, okanye usapho nje lutsale amashumi okanye amakhulu amawaka eedola kwiakhawunti yebhanki yobuqhophololo ngeBusiness Email Compromise (BEC), i-invoyisi yomthengisi ogqwethiweyo, okanye ukuqweqwedisa ngocingo ngexabiso lezindlu yimeko engxamisekileyo, yomzuzu-ngomzuzu yezemali. Ngokungafaniyo nobuqhetseba bekhadi letyala, apho abathengi bakhuselwe yimithetho ye-zero-liability kunye neentsuku ezingama-60 zeefestile zokubuyisela imali, i-bank wire transfer (Fedwire, SWIFT, CHAPS, okanye SEPA) okanye urhwebo ACH i-push yenzelwe ukuhlala njengemali engenakuguqulwa. Nangona kunjalo, ukugqithisela ngocingo ngobuqhetseba AKUKHO ukuphelelwa lithemba ngoko nangoko ukuba uthatha amanyathelo kwiiyure zokuqala ezingama-24 ukuya kwezingama-48. Amaqela olwaphulo-mthetho akanakungena lula kwisebe lasekhaya aze akhuphe i-250,000 yeedola kwimali yephepha ebonakalayo; Iimali ezibiweyo kufuneka ziqale zihlale ngaphakathi kwiakhawunti "yemali imeyile" yasekhaya okanye zidlule kwiibhanki zokucoca ngaphambi kokuba zifakwe kwi-wire offshore ukuya eHong Kong, eTshayina, kwi-United Arab Emirates, eTurkey, okanye iguqulwe kwi-cryptocurrency exchange. Ukuba uvusa i-interbank esemthethweni Bamba Ungenabungozi / Ileta ye-Indemnity Recall (SWIFT MT192 / pacs.004) kunye nokubandakanya unyanzeliso lomthetho wesizwe Ikhonkco lokubulala ubuqhophololo ngokwezeMali (FFKC) ngaphambi kokuba ibhanki efumanayo itshayele imali, iibhanki kunye nabameli baseburhulumenteni bamisa baze babuyise amakhulu ezigidi zeerandi kwiintambo ezibiweyo rhoqo ngonyaka.

Ukuba ubuqhophololo ngocingo bubandakanya ukuxhwilwa ngokwasemzimbeni, imfuno yokubamba, okanye isoyikiso sangoko sobundlobongela, tsalela inombolo yakho kaxakeka yasekuhlaleni (911 eUnited States naseKhanada, 112 kwiManyano yaseYurophu, 999 eUnited Kingdom) okanye ujonge uluhlu lwethu lwamazwe ngamazwe amanani kaxakeka ngoko nangoko. Kubo bonke ubuqhophololo be-invoyisi yenkampani, ukuqweqwediswa kwecingo lwetayitile yezindlu, kunye nobuqhophololo ngocingo lomntu, yeka yonke into kwaye wenze ulandelelwano lokukhumbula olungxamisekileyo olunamanyathelo ama-6 ngezantsi kwimizuzu eli-15 elandelayo.

Yenza oku ngoku

  1. Fowunela i-Origining Bank's Wire Fraud / Treasury Operations Desk kwisithuba semizuzu emi-5 kwaye ufune ngokukhawuleza "Ubuqhophololo boKhumbula ngokuBamba okuNgenabungozi / iLeta yesiXhobo": Musa ukulinda emgceni kwifestile yomthengisi wesebe, kwaye ungathumeli umyalezo wewebhu okhuselekileyo. Fowunela inombolo yefowuni ekwirisithi yesebe lakho okanye umnxeba kanondyebo weshishini kwaye usebenzise la magama ngqo: "Silixhoba le-imeyile yoShishino eCompromise ubuqhophololo ngocingo oluthunyelwe ngo-[Umhla/Ixesha] nge-[$Amount].Fedwire Recall / SWIFT MT192 / camt.056) kwiBhanki eYamkelayo YAYE ikhuphe i-interbank Bamba uNgenabungozi/Ileta yesiXhobo egameni lethu ukuze iSebe leBhanki eYamkelayo liyivale i-akhawunti yabaxhamli ngoko nangoko."
  2. **Kwangaxeshanye jonga iBhanki eYamkela ubuqhophololo ngendlela yayo / ABA / SWIFT BIC ikhowudi kwaye ufowunele iSebe leBhanki yokuFumana ubuqhophololo ngokuthe ngqo : Musa ukulinda iiyure ezi-6 ukuba i-ofisi yebhanki yakho yangasemva ithumele umyalezo kwibhanki ye-scammer. Jonga imiyalelo yocingo olukhohlisayo oluthunyelwe ngu-scammer, fumana ** Ukufumana igama leBhanki ** kunye ne-ABA Routing Number / IBAN / SWIFT BIC, biza ukhuseleko lwenkampani yebhanki okanye i-hotline ye-wire fraud ngqo, kwaye ubanike inombolo ye-IMAD / OMAD ** (ye-US Fedwire), ** UETR ye-Akhawunti, ** i-akhawunti ye-SWIFT, kunye ne-Dollar Inani. Ngelixa ibhanki eyamkelayo ayizukuyibuyisela imali kuwe ngefowuni, isilumkiso esithe ngqo esivela kwixhoba elidityaniswe ne IMAD/OMAD inombolo yomkhondo isoloko ikhuthaza abahlalutyi bobuqhophololo bangaphakathi beBhanki ukuba babeke imali yorhwaphilizo kulawulo olumisiweyo kwi-akhawunti yorhwaphilizo logama besalinde iLeta yoKhuseleko yebhanki yakho.
  3. Fayila i-FBI IC3 yexesha likaxakeka yesikhalazo (ic3.gov) eUnited States ukuze kusebenze iQela le-FBI yokuBuyisa iAsethi (RAT) kunye neChayini yokuBulala koBuqhophololo (FFKC): Ukuba ucingo lusuka okanye lwadlula kwi-akhawunti yebhanki yase-United States phakathi kwe-iyure ezingama-72 zokugqibela (ingakumbi ukuba i-$50,000+ okanye nasiphi na isixa-mali sokuvala umhlaba), yiya ku-ic3.gov ngoku kwaye ungenise isikhalazo kwi-intanethi. Ngenisa ngokucacileyo "i-BEC / Ubuqhophololo bokuGqithisela ngocingo-Ithunyelwe kwiiyure ezingama-72 ezidlulileyo" phezulu kwinkcazo kunye nebhanki ephuma ngqo, ibhanki efumanayo, iinombolo ze-ABA, iinombolo ze-akhawunti, kunye IMAD/OMAD trace amanani. I-FBI's Iqela le-Asethi yoBuyiselo (RAT) lisebenza ngejelo lonxibelelwano lwexesha lokwenyani elithe ngqo kunye neebhanki zasekhaya kunye ne-FinCEN ukubeka ulawulo lwe-federal kwi-akhawunti yemali-meyile yasekhaya (ukufumana impumelelo yembali yokukhenkcela edlula i-70 yeepesenti xa kuxelwe phambi kokuba ucingo lutsibele kude nonxweme).
  4. E-UK, e-EU, eKhanada, okanye eOstreliya, yenza ukuba umgca wakho welizwe uthintele ubuqhophololo ngoko nangoko:
    • United Kingdom: Fowunela umnxeba worhwaphilizo webhanki yakho usebenzisa i-159 Stop Scams hotline* (cofa ngokulula 159), xela ngoko nangoko ku-Action Action (0300 123 2040: khetha indlela yobuqhophololo esebenzayo ukuba imali isendleleni ngoku), kwaye ubize UMlawuli weeNkqubo zeNtlawulo (PSR) iMithetho ye-APP yeMbuyiselo yobuqhophololo eSinyanzelo (isebenza ngo-Oktobha 2024 yeeNtlawulo eziKhawulezayo kunye neeCHAPS).
    • IManyano yaseYurophu: Funa iNgxowa-mali ye-SEPA yokuTshintshela iTyala ngokukhawuleza (camt.056 / pacs.004)** ngenxa FRAD (Imvelaphi yobuqhophololo) ngebhanki yakho kwaye ufake ingxelo yamapolisa ngoko nangoko ukuze iiYunithi zoBukrelekrele bezeMali kazwelonke (FIU) inokukhupha umiselo olungxamisekileyo lokunqumla imida phantsi kwemiyalelo ye-EU AML.
    • Canada & Australia: Xela ngoko nangoko kwidesika yokukhumbula ucingo lwebhanki yakho, **Canadian Anti-Urhwaphilizo Centre (CAFC) / iyunithi yolwaphulo-mthetho lwamapolisa asekuhlaleni **, okanye Australian National Anti-Scam Centre / AFCX Urhwaphilizo Reporting Exchange (cyber.gov.au).
  5. ** UNGAMBUZI nge-imeyile umntu okhohlakeleyo, UNGAMBUZI "Ngaba ulufumene ucingo?", kwaye UNGALUVUMI umsonto we-imeyile ochaphazelekileyo **: Lo mzuzu umkhohlisi eqonda ukuba ubhaqile ubuqhophololo, baya kungena kwangoko kwiakhawunti yebhanki ye-imeyile kwaye batshayele nayiphi na imali eseleyo nge-crypto rails okanye iingcingo zamazwe ngamazwe. Gcina i-scammer ebumnyameni ngokupheleleyo ngelixa ibhanki yakho kunye ne-FBI imisa iakhawunti yendawo.
  6. Gcina iiheader ze-imeyile ezichaphazelekileyo (EML / MSG iifayile) kwaye wahlule ibhokisi yeposi eyaphukileyo: Sukucima ii-imeyile ze-invoyisi zobuqhophololo. Cela iqela lakho le-IT likhuphele ngaphandle imibhalo engasentla kwemiyalezo ekrwada (Authentication-Results, Received: from, Reply-To) kwaye ujonge zombini inkqubo yakho ye-imeyile kunye nenkqubo ye-imeyile yomthengisi ngemithetho efihlakeleyo yokuthunyelwa kwebhokisi yangaphakathi (bona isikhokelo sethu i-akhawunti ye-imeyile egqekeziweyo: imithetho yokuthunyelwa efihliweyo kunye nokubuyisela).

Danger

Ungaze uxhomekeke kuLuhlu olulula "lokuCelwa kocingo olucelwe nguMthengi" kwisebe lakho lebhanki. Ukuba umabhalane webhanki ucofa inkqubo yesiqhelo ethi "Ukucinywa koMthengi / ukuKhumbula impazamo" ikhowudi endaweni ye-Ubuqhophololo obuKhumbulayo obuxhaswa yi-Interbank Hold Letter of Intemnity (LOI), iBhanki eYamkelayo ifunwa ngokusemthethweni ukuba icele umnini-akhawunti (ulwaphulo-mthetho) imvume yokubuyisela imali, kwaye ulwaphulo-mthetho ngokuqinisekileyo luya kuthi hayi. A Bamba Ngokungeyongozi / Ileta yesiKhuselo sisiqinisekiso esisemthethweni esisemthethweni esisuka kwiBhanki eQalayo ukuya kwiBhanki eYamkelayo ethembisa ukukhulula iBhanki eYamkelayo kuso nasiphi na isimangalo ukuba iBhanki eYamkelayo iyayivala iakhawunti yolwaphulo-mthetho ize ibuyisele imali ebiweyo ebhankini yakho. Soloko unyanzelisa ukuba iDesika yoBuqhophololo yocingo yebhanki yakho ithumele Bamba isiVumelwano sokuBuyisela ngokungenabungozi ngoko nangoko.

Umthi wesigqibo: ukwenza ukhutshelo lwebhanki olungxamisekileyo ngomzila wentlawulo

Sebenzisa le tshati ekhawulezayo yokusebenza ukwenza iprothokholi yokukhumbula ngqo kwinethiwekhi yakho yentlawulo ethile (Fedwire, ACH, SWIFT, okanye CHAPS/Faster Payments):

flowchart TD
    A["Ucingo lobuqhophololo okanye uTshintshelo lombane lufunyenwe"] --> B["Chonga Umzila kaloliwe oHlawulelwa ngokuthe ngqo kwaye ufumane iNombolo yokuKhangela ngoko nangoko"]
    B --> C{"Yeyiphi Intlawulo kaloliwe eyasetyenziswa?"}
    C -->|"I-US Domestic Wire (Fedwire)"| D["Fumana iNombolo yoMkhondo eneempawu ezingama-22 ze-IMAD / OMAD kwiBhanki eyiOrigining"]
    C -->|"ucingo lwamazwe ngamazwe (SWIFT)"| E["Fumana ikopi ye-36-Character SWIFT UETR & MT103 kwi-Originating Bank"]
    C -->|"Ukudluliselwa kwe-ACH yasekhaya yase-US"| F["Fumana i-15-Digit ACH Trace Number kwi-Origining Bank"]
    C -->|"IiNtlawulo eziKhawulezayo zase-UK / iCHAPS okanye i-EU SEPA"| G["Fumana iiNtlawulo eziKhawulezayo FPID / CHAPS Ref okanye SEPA End-to-End ID"]
    D --> H["1. IBhanki eQalayo ithumela ukuBuyiselwa koBuqhetseba kwiXesha likaXakeka + Bamba intlawulo engenabungozi kwiBhanki eYamkelayo"]
    E --> H
    F --> I{"Zingaphi iintsuku zokusebenza ukususela ekuhlalweni kwe-ACH?"}
    I -->|"Emgceni / Usuku olufanayo"| J["Rhoxisa i-ACH engatshintshiyo okanye ukhuphe ngokukhawuleza i-NACHA ODFI Buyisa/Khumbula"]
    I -->|"I-1 ukuya kwiiNtsuku zeShishini ze-5"| K["Funa i-ODFI Thumela i-ACH Recall + Ileta ye-Indemnity kwiDesika yobuqhophololo ye-RFI"]
    G --> L["Cofa inombolo ye-159 (e-UK) / iBhanki yobuqhophololo: Qalisa i-Interbank Freeze ngokukhawuleza kunye neBango lembuyekezo ye-PSR ye-APP"]
    H --> M["2. Iminxeba yexhoba eliFumana iDesika yobuqhophololo yeBhanki ngokuthe ngqo nge-IMAD/UETR kunye neNombolo yeakhawunti yoMxhamli."]
    K --> M
    M --> N["3. Ifayile ye-FBI IC3 (ic3.gov) ngaphakathi kwe-72h ukuze isebenze i-FBI RAT / iTyayini yokuBulala koBuqhophololo + iNgxelo yamaPolisa asekuhlaleni"]

Inqanaba loku-1: Izazisi ezibalulekileyo kufuneka uzifumane kwibhanki yakho kwimizuzu eli-15 yokuqala

Xa ufowunela ibhanki yakho, ibhanki eyamkelayo, kunye ne-FBI okanye amapolisa, usithi "Sifake i-142,000 yeedola kwiBhanki yaseMelika ngale ntsasa" akwanelanga ukufumana intengiselwano kwinkqubo yokucoca eqhuba izigidi zemiyalezo ngeyure. Kuya kufuneka ngoko nangoko ubuze iBhanki yakho yeNqaku ngeyona nombolo ye-cryptographic/yokucoca yomzila wentlawulo osetyenzisiweyo:

Intlawulo kaloliwe Igama leSazisi esisemthethweni Ijongeka njani kunye nento eyenzayo Usebenza njani uMyalezo wokuKhumbula
** ucingo lwasekhaya lwase-US (Fedwire Funds Service)** IMAD (Idatha yokuphendula ngeNgeniso yoMyalezo) kunye OMAD (Idatha yokuPhendula ngoMyalezo wokuPhumayo) Umtya wealphanumeric onamagama angama-22 oqulethe umhla womjikelo (YYYYMMDD), i-8-character ethumela i-identifier ye-Federal Reserve ABA, kunye nenombolo ye-6 yokulandelelana (umzekelo, 20261031MMQFMPB1000412). Ibhanki yakho ithumela a Fedwire Service Message (Sub-type 31 - Request for Reversal) okanye ISO 20022 camt.056 ilandelwa yileta esayiniweyo Bamba iLeta engenabungozi / yoKhuseleko kwiDesika yoBuqhetseba yeBhanki eYamkelayo.
Ucingo lwamazwe ngamazwe (SWIFT Network) UETR (Isalathiso seNtengiselwano esahlukileyo esiPheleleyo ukuya esiphelweni) + MT103 / pacs.008 Ikopi yomyalezo Umtya onamagama angama-36 owahlukileyo kwihlabathi jikelele UUID v4 (umzekelo, 97ed4827-7b6f-4491-a06f-b548d5a7512d) ilandelwa ngexesha lokwenyani kuyo yonke ibhanki engumlamli nge SWIFT gpi Tracker. Ibhanki yakho ithumela ngokukhawuleza SWIFT MT192 / MT199 (camt.056) Isicelo sokurhoxiswa (Isizathu: FRAD) ecaleni kwekhonkco lomlamli ngqo ukumisa intlawulo PHAMBI kokuba umxhamli wokugqibela afake ityala kwiakhawunti yolwaphulo-mthetho.
** Indlu yase-US yokucoca ngokuzenzekela (ACH)** 15-Digit ACH Trace Number Amanani okuqala asi-8 yiOriginating Depository Financial Institution (ODFI) inombolo yomzila, elandelwa yinombolo ye-7 yolandelelwano. Ukuba ibanjwe ngaphambi kokuba ibhetshi inqunyulwe, ibhanki yakho iyayicima ifayile. Emva kokuthunyelwa, ibhanki yakho (i ODFI) uqhagamshelane neBhanki eYamkelayo (RDFI) nge Ileta yoKhuphiswano ecela ukumisa ubuqhophololo ngesandla kunye nokubuyiswa (R06 Ibuyiselwe ngokwesicelo se-ODFI).
UK CHAPS / Faster Payments kunye ne-EU SEPA FPID (I-ID yeNtlawulo eKhawulezayo) / ICHAPS UETR / SEPA End-to-End ID Isalathiso sentengiselwano esisodwa esibonakalayo kwisikrini sokuqinisekisa intlawulo okanye kwileja yebhanki. Kwi-SEPA, ibhanki yakho ithumela camt.056 Khumbula ubuqhophololo (FRAD) ngaphakathi kwefestile ye-SEPA yeenyanga ezili-13 (umkhenkce ngoko nangoko ukuba ibhalansi ihleli). E-UK, ibhengeza **Iintlawulo eziKhawulezayo ze-APP yokuQinisa ubuqhophololo ** kunye nemithetho ye-PSR yokuBuyiselwa kweMbuyiselo eSinyanzelo **.

Kutheni uMthetheli / IiBhanki zeNtatheli zinguMhlobo wakho woMkhulu kwi-International Wire Recall

Ukuba umkhohlisi ukukhohlisile ekufakeni kwiingcingo ze-USD okanye kwi-EUR kwibhanki engaselunxwemeni eHong Kong, eChina, eSingapore, eDubai, okanye eMpuma Yurophu, ucingo lwe-SWIFT lwamazwe ngamazwe alufane luthumele ngokuthe ngqo kwi-US okanye kwibhanki yaseYurophu ukuya kwibhanki yangaphandle ngemizuzwana emi-5.

Endaweni yoko, iingcingo zamazwe ngamazwe zihamba ngetsheyiniklzzwxh:0022 (ezana neJPMorgan Chase New York, Citibank N.A., Bank of New York Mellon, Deutsche Bank Frankfurt, okanye iStandard Chartered) kwaye kufuneka idlule kwi-Time-Zone Cutoffs** kunye ne*Automated Sanctions/Automated Sanctions/Automated Sanctions. Ngenxa yokuba iiyure zebhanki zaseAsia-Pacific kunye naseYurophu azidibanisi neeyure zaseMntla Melika emva kwemini, ucingo lwamazwe ngamazwe oluthunyelwe ngo-14:00 ixesha laseNew York lihlala lihlala ngaphakathi kumgca weBhanki yoMbhali waseNew York okanye lihleli lingenatyala ngaphakathi kumgca wokuqinisekisa ongenayo wakusasa webhanki kangange 8 ukuya kwiiyure ezingama-24.

  • Inyathelo ekufuneka uliThathile Ngokukhawuleza: Cela ibhanki yakho ukuba ijonge i-SWIFT gpi Tracker* isebenzisa oonobumba abangama-36 UETR. I-SWIFT gpi Tracker ibonisa ngexesha lokwenyani ukuba yeyiphi iBhanki ebambeleyo ngoku ebambe iimali (In Transit at Intermediary vs. Credited to Beneficiary).
  • Ukuba ucingo lusahleli kwiBhanki yoMthetheli weBhanki eNew York, eLondon, okanye eFrankfurt, ibhanki yakho ingathumela okuphambili SWIFT MT192 / camt.056 Misa/Khumbula ngqo kulaa Bhanki yoMlamli (kwaye unokwazisa iBhanki ePhakamileyo eNew York/igumbi laseLondon ngocingo nge UETR), ukumisa imali ngaphambi kokuba iphume kulawulo lwasekhaya.

Inqanaba lesi-2: Ukuqalisa i-FBI Financial Fraud Kill Chain (FFKC) kunye nokunyanzeliswa komthetho kubambe.

Xa ujongene nobuqhophololo bocingo ngaphezulu kwe-10,000 yeedola (kwaye ngakumbi i-$50,000+ yokuvala iingcingo zenkampani okanye izindlu), isebe lebhanki yakho yobuqhophololo lisisiqingatha seequation. Ii-arhente zogcino mthetho zinamagunya asemthethweni okubangela umiselo olungxamisekileyo ekufumaneni iibhanki kunye neerempu ze-cryptocurrency nangaphambi kokuba kutyikitywe isigunyaziso senkundla esisesikweni.

1. EUnited States: Njani iQela le-FBI yoBuyiselo lweAsethi (RAT) kunye FFKC Sebenza

Isekwe ngo-2018 ngaphakathi kwiZiko le-FBI le-Intanethi yesikhalazo soLwaphulo-mthetho (IC3), Iqela le-Asethi yoBuyiselo (i-RAT) lilungelelanisa unxibelelwano phakathi kweeofisi zentsimi ze-FBI, amaziko emali asekhaya, kunye neNethiwekhi yokuQinisekisa uLwaphulo-mthetho lwezeMali (FinCEN) phantsi kwe Financial Fraud Kill Chain (FFKC) inkqubo.

Ukunyusa isantya se FFKC khumbula, faka ingxelo yakho ku-ic3.gov* ngoko nangoko (ungalindi kude kube ngomso kusasa ukuze udibane negqwetha kuqala, faka ifayile ic3.gov ifomu kwiyure yokuqala yokufumanisa ubusela) kwaye uquke yonke indawo engezantsi kunye neetypos zero:

  1. IiNkcukacha zexhoba: Igama lakho elisemthethweni, igama lenkampani, inombolo yomnxeba (sebenzisa inombolo yeselfowuni ngqo oya kuyiphendula ngo-24/7 kwiringi yokuqala), kunye nedilesi ye-imeyile engachanekanga.
  2. IiNkcukacha zeBhanki eziphuma kuyo: Igama elipheleleyo lebhanki, idilesi yesebe, inombolo ye-akhawunti yakho ophuma kuyo, inombolo ye-ABA yomzila, kunye negama/inombolo yefowuni yegosa lobuqhetseba lebhanki othethe nalo.
  3. IiNkcukacha zeBhanki zoMxhamli (Umkhohlisi): Igama elipheleleyo lebhanki efumanayo, ibhanki efumana isixeko/ilizwe/ilizwe, ABA iNombolo yokuRouting / SWIFT BIC, iNombolo yeAkhawunti yoMxhamli, kunye negama ngqo loMbonelelwa elibhalwe kwimiyalelo yocingo lobuqhophololo.
  4. IiNkcukacha zeBhanki ezingoMthetheleli/iMbhali (ukuba zikhona): Naliphi na igama lebhanki elingumthetheli, i-SWIFT BIC, okanye inombolo yomzila edweliswe kwiphepha le-wire sheet.
  5. Idatha yentengiselwano: Eyona mali yedola ukuya kutsho kwisenti, isitampu esichanekileyo kunye nomhla owenziwe ngawo ucingo, kunye ne- 22-character Fedwire IMAD/OMAD inombolo okanye i-SWIFT enamagama angama-36 UETR.
  6. ** Landela umnxeba emva kokuthunyelwa ic3.gov**:
    • Gcina/print ikopi yePDF oyingenisileyo ic3.gov isikhalazo ngoko nangoko.
    • Fowunela iofisi yakho yeNdawo yeFBI (fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices) kunye ** yakho yengingqi yaseUnited States Secret Service (USSS) iOfisi yeNdawo** (secretservice.gov/contact/field-offices, I-Secret Service Cyber ​​​​Furud Task Forces co-lead BEC wire ikhumbula ecaleni kwe-FBI).
    • Tshela i-arhente yomsebenzi kwifowuni: * "Sisanda kungenisa isikhalazo se-IC3 esiphuthumayo kwi-Business Email Compromise transfer transfer wire [$ Amount] ethunyelwe [X] kwiiyure ezidlulileyo. Sinenombolo ye-Fedwire IMAD / SWIFT UETR esandleni kwaye sicele ukulungelelaniswa okungxamisekileyo kunye neQela le-IC3 yokuBuyisela i-Asethi ye-Financial Fraud Kill Chain ukukhumbula."

2. EUnited Kingdom: The 159 Umnxeba weHotline kunye nemigaqo ka-Okthobha ka-2024 ye-PSR eSinyanzelo yeMbuyiselo ye-APP yobuqhophololo

Ukuba wena okanye ishishini lakho elincinci/isisa e-United Kingdom niqhathiwe ekuthumeleni imali yebhanki (eyaziwa kumthetho webhanki yase-UK njenge Intlawulo eGunyaziweyo yokutyhala (APP) Ubuqhophololo, apho umkhohlisi ekukhohlisa ukuba ugunyazise iNtlawulo eKhawulezayo okanye ucingo lwe-CHAPS nge-invoyisi yomgunyathi, ukudlulisela ukulinganisa kwegqwetha, okanye ubuqhophololo bokuzenza ebhankini):

  1. Dawunela 159 Ngoko nangoko: Ikuqhagamshela ngqo kwidesika yothintelo lobuqhophololo yebhanki yakho yase-UK ukuze iqalise isicelo esingxamisekileyo seNtlawulo eKhawulezayo / i-CHAPS yokumisa ibhanki phakathi kweebhanki kwibhanki eyamkelayo.
  2. Bheka iLungelo lakho elisemthethweni lokuBuyiselwa kweMbuyiselo phantsi koMlawuli weeNkqubo zeNtlawulo (PSR) Ipolisi PS23/4 & PS24/3:
    • Ngaphantsi kwemithetho ephawulekayo ye-UK Payment Systems Regulator ethathe isiphumo somthetho nge-7 Oktobha 2024 , ababoneleli ngenkonzo yentlawulo yase-UK (PSPs) zi ziyafuneka ngokusemthethweni ukubuyisela amaxhoba afanelekileyo oBuqhophololo obuQinisekisiweyo bePush Payment (APP) obuthunyelwe ngeeNtlawulo eziKhawulezileyo okanye iCHAPS ukuya kuthi ga kwi-£85,000* phakathi kweentsuku ezi-5 zomsebenzi** (okanye ukuya kuthi ga kwii-35 zeentsuku zokusebenza ukuba ibhanki ibiza ilungiselelo lophando "lokumisa iwotshi", ngaphandle kokuba ibhanki inokungqina umthengi (umthengi othe wanyanzelwa ngokusemthethweni) Umgangatho Wokulumkisa) okanye wayebandakanyeka kubuqhophololo.
    • Nokuba imali ebiweyo igqithise kwi-£85,000 (umzekelo, i-£250,000 ye-deposit scam ye-deposit scam), ungabanga i-£85,000 yokuqala phantsi kweskimu esisinyanzelo se-PSR KWAYE ulandele intsalela ukuya ku-£430,000 ngokunyusa isikhalazo kwi-Inkonzo ye-Financial OmbunFOS, financial-ombudsman.org.uk) ukuba ibhanki ethumelayo okanye eyamkelayo ayiphumelelanga imisebenzi yayo yokujonga ubuqhophololo okanye phantsi kweModeli yembuyekezo enokwenzeka (CRM) imigaqo yelifa.

Inqanaba lesi-3: Izicwangciso zamanyathelo athile ngokwemeko yobuqhophololo ngocingo

Indlela olwenzeka ngayo ubuqhophololo imisela ukuba ngubani omnye ekufuneka aziswe ngokukhawuleza ukuba ayeke ubusela besibini kunye nokuseka ubutyala obusemthethweni.

Imeko A: Ukuvalwa kweReal Estate / Isihloko & ne-Escrow Wire Hijack (Intlawulo ePhantsi yoMthengi weKhaya ibiwe)

Ubuqhophololo bocingo lokuvala izindlu lelinye lolona lwaphulo-mthetho lunexabiso eliphezulu elichaphazela iintsapho. Abahlaseli babeka esichengeni iakhawunti ye-imeyile ye- ** I-Arhente yezindlu, i-Mortgage Broker, iNkampani yeTitle, okanye iGqwetha elivalayo ** kwiinyanga ezingaphambili, beka iliso elithe cwaka kwikhalenda yomhla wakho wokuvala, kwaye uthumele i-imeyile kwiiyure ezingama-24 ukuya kwezingama-48 ngaphambi kokuvala ngokuncamathisela okunokwenyani kwePDF: *"NGXAMISEKILE: IMiyalelo yocingo eHlaziyiweyo ye [Title End-Audit-akhawunti yeNkampani]

Ukuba uthe wahlawula intlawulo yekhaya lakho okanye uvala imali kwi-scammer: 1. Phumeza amaNyathelo 1, 2, kunye nesi-3 ukusuka ku-"Yenza oku ngoku" ngokukhawuleza: Fumana i IMAD/OMAD kwibhanki yakho, funa ngoko nangoko Hold Harmless Recall, fowunela idesika yobuqhophololo yebhanki efumana ngqo, kwaye ifayile ku. ic3.gov kwimizuzu engama-30 yokuqala. 2. ** Fowunela iNkampani yeSitayiti yokwenyani / iGqwetha lokuvala ngeFowuni Kwangoko : - Xelela igosa le-escrow leNkampani kunye nomcebisi jikelele ukuba ucingo lwakho lokuvala luphambukiswe nge-imeyile eyonakeleyo okanye eyonakeleyo. - Bacele ukuba bagcine zonke iilog zeseva ye-imeyile ekupheleni kwabo, bejonga ngokukodwa ukuba umhlaseli ungene ngokuthe ngqo kwi-akhawunti yeNkampani yeSiHlomelo yeMicrosoft 365 / Google Workspace okanye iakhawunti ye-imeyile yeRealtor. (Phantsi kwemithetho yokungakhathali yelizwe lase-US kunye neemfundiso ezingafaniyo zeKhowudi yezoRhwebo, ukugqiba yekabani inkqubo ye-imeyile eye yaphulwa ngaphandle kwe-MFA eyaneleyo ibaluleke kakhulu ukuba ucingo aluyiyo i-100 yeepesenti efunyenwe kwiibhanki). - Buza iNkampani yeSihloko ukuba ingaba baphethe ** Ulwaphulo-mthetho lwe-Cyber ​​​​/ubuNjineli beNtlalo / iNgxowa-mali yoBuqhetseba boBuqhetseba okanye ukunxulumana nesihloko sombhali ongaphantsi (ofana neFidelity National Title, i-Fidelity National Title, i-First American, i-Old Republic, okanye iSihloko se-Stewart), uninzi lwazo lugcina ezabo ezizinikeleyo ** 24/7 i-Rapid Wire Recovery Coalitions** kunye nabafowunelwa abakhulu abalawulayo kwibhanki. 3. ** Yazisa uMthengisi kunye ne-Real Estate Agents ngokuBhala **: Ukuba iimali zakho zokuvala zigcinwe kwi-FBI esebenzayo / uphando lwe-interbank recall, yiba negqwetha lezindlu nomhlaba ngokukhawuleza uthumele isaziso esicela imfutshane ** Ukwandiswa koMhla wokuValwa kweKhontrakthi / Ukunyanzeliswa kweSihlomelo soNyango lweMajeure ** ukuze ungalahleki ngokuzenzekelayo idiphozithi yakho yemali enyanisekileyo ngelixa i-4-day khumbula idiphozithi yemali ngexesha lokukhumbula i-4-day.

Imeko B: Ubuqhophololo kwi-invoyisi yoMthengisi (i-Akhawunti ye-B2B eHlawulelekayo)

Kubuqhophololo be-invoyisi yomthengisi we-B2B, ii-Akhawunti zakho ziyahlawulwa (AP) isebe lifumana i-imeyile evela kumboneleli wokwenyani, owahlala ixesha elide (billing@supplier.com okanye isizinda esifana neso billing@suppIier.com) echaza: "Nceda uqaphele ukuba sitshintshile iakhawunti yethu yokusebenza kwezorhwebo ukusuka eWells Fargo ukuya kwiTruist Bank; nceda uhlaziye imiyalelo yethu ye-ACH/Wire ye-Invoyisi #90412."

Ukuba ishishini lakho lihlawule i-invoyisi yokwenyani kwiakhawunti yebhanki yobuqhophololo: 1. Yenza iBhanki iBamba uKhumbula okungenabungozi kunye ne-FBI ic3.gov gcwalisa kwangoko. 2. Misa ukuba yekabani iseva ye-imeyile ethe yaphulwa (Eyakho xa ithelekiswa neyomthengisi wakho): - Cela iqela lakho loKhuseleko lwe-IT lihlole ekrwada EML iiheader zemiyalezo ye-imeyile yobuqhophololo: - Sanisa ukuba i-imeyile yoMthengisi yokwenyani iHacked (Inyanisekile kuMthengisi): I-imeyile idlulile SPF: PASS, DKIM: PASS, kwaye DMARC: PASS kwindawo yomthengisi yokwenyani (@supplier.com), kwaye yavela kwiMicrosoft/Google's real mail servers. Oku kuthetha ukuba umhlaseli okwangoku uhleli ngaphakathi kwibhokisi ye-imeyile yokwenyani yomthengisi wakho. Fowunela i-CFO yomthengisi wakho kunye noMlawuli we-IT emnxebeni ngoko nangoko, kuba kwaloo mhlaseli mnye ngoku uthumela imiyalelo yocingo olungeyonyani* kuye wonke omnye umthengi kwi-inbox yomthengisi wakho**. - Umqondiso weDomain efana ne-Lookkalike / i-Display Name Spoof: I-imeyile ivela @supp1ier.com okanye @supplier-payments.com (jonga whois umhla wokudala, odla ngokubhaliswa kwiintsuku ezili-14 zokugqibela). Oku kuthetha nokuba ibhokisi yemeyile yomqeshwa wakho iye yaphulwa (ukuvumela umqhekezi ukuba afunde i-invoyisi yoqobo yePDF kwaye enze idomeyini ehambelanayo ebukekayo Reply-To indawo yokuthengisa ukuze umthengisi angaziboni iimpendulo kwisiqulathi seefayili esiThunyelweyo. 3. Beka i-Inshurensi yakho ye-Cyber ​​kunye ne-Inshurensi yoLwaphulo-mthetho kwiSaziso esiKhawulezayo: - Uninzi lwemigaqo-nkqubo ye-Inshurensi ye-Cyber Liability** kunye nemigaqo-nkqubo ye-Commercial Crime / Fidelity Bond iquka Ubuqhophololo bobuNjineli beNtlalo / iNgxowa-mali yokuTshintshela ubuqhophololo / ukuLalwa kwe-invoyisi uqinisekiso lokhuselo, KWAYE zibandakanya 24/7 Isiganeko sokuPhendula ngeForensics kunye ne-Legal Breach Coach hotlines ngaphaya kweendleko zakho ezikhutshwayo ngexabiso eliphantsi. - Isilumkiso ngeMida ebekiweyo yeSaziso se-Inshurensi: Iipolisi ezininzi ze-inshurensi ze-intanethi zifuna isaziso phakathi kwe-24 ukuya kwiiyure ezingama-72* zokufumanisa ukuthunyelwa kwe-wire ngobuqhetseba. Tsalela umnxeba we-24/7 wamabango kwiphepha lakho lesibhengezo sepolisi namhlanje.

Imeko C: I-CEO / uMlinganiso weSigqeba ("Ukufumana okuMfihlo okuNgxamisekileyo / Ikhadi lesipho / uTshintsho loMvuzo")

Ukuba umqeshwa ukhohliswe nge-imeyile, itekisi ye-SMS, i-WhatsApp, okanye ** Deepfake AI Voice / Video Call ** ezenza i-CEO okanye uMphathi oLawulayo kwi-wiring yemali kwi-akhawunti yangaphandle, okanye ukuba i-Payroll yakhohliswa ekutshintsheni iDiphozithi eNgqongileyo yesigqeba (ACH) inamba ejikelezayo: 1. Ngokuhlawula iDiphozithi eNgqongileyo yeDiphozithi yeDiphozithi: Qhagamshelana neProsesa yakho yePayroll (**ADP, Gusto, Paychex, Workday, Rippling, UKG **) ngaphakathi kwemizuzu kwaye ufune i-*Nyuma ye-NACHA ACH Recall / Reversal ** kunye noBuqhophololo boBuqhophololo ekufumaneni ikhadi elihlawulelwa kwangaphambili okanye inombolo yebhanki (ihlala rhoqo i-Sutton Dot, i-Pathncor, i-Green Dot, i-Chimeward, i-Pathncor). Abalungisi bemivuzo bazinikele kwiidesika zokubuyisela umva ubuqhophololo ngobuninzi kunye nobudlelwane obuthe ngqo kwiibhanki ezikhupha i-neo-bank.

Tip

Kuthekani ukuba ibhanki yakho okanye ibhanki efumanayo iyala ukusebenzisana okanye irhuqa iinyawo emva kokuba ucele ukuKhumbula okuNgenabungozi? Ngaphantsi Inqaku leKhowudi yoRhwebo efanayo 4A (UCC § 4A-207) eUnited States, ukuba umyalelo wentlawulo yocingo uchonga umxhamli bobabini nge-Gama (umzekelo, "Acme Construction LLC") KUNYE nge-Inombolo ye-akhawunti (eyeka-"John Doe Scammer"), kunye nebhanki efumanayo yayinolwazi lokwenyani lokutshintshwa kwegama ukuya kwi-akhawunti, ukungangqinelani kwentlawulo yebhanki phambi kokuba ifumane intlawulo esemthethweni. Ngaphaya koko, ukuthumela ugcino olubhaliweyo olusesikweni kunye nesaziso sokukhumbula ngokusetyenziswa komcebisi wezomthetho wenkampani yakho kuwo omabini amaSebe eBhanki eQalayo kunye noKwamkela iBhanki yokuThobela iLegal/Subpoena iqinisekisa ukuba nakuphi na ukulibaziseka kwicala lawo kubhaliwe kwirekhodi.

Inqanaba lesi-4: Ungatsho njani ukuba inethiwekhi yakho isasuleleka kwaye uthintele ukubiwa kocingo lwesibini

Abahlaseli abakhuphe ngempumelelo i-100,000+ yeedola zobuqhophololo ngocingo ngokuchasene nombutho ** phantse basoloko bezama okwesibini kwiintsuku ezisi-7 ukuya kwezili-14**, mhlawumbi bejolise kwenye i-invoyisi yomthengisi evulekileyo abasele beyikhuphile kwibhokisi yakho ye-akhawunti, okanye bathumelele abathengi bakho nge-imeyile ukuze baphambukise iiAkhawunti ezingenayo iintlawulo ezifunyanwayo kude nenkampani yakho.

Gqibezela olu Phicotho-zincwadi lweForensic lwamanqaku ama-5 phambi kokuba ugunyazise naziphi na iintlawulo ezingaphaya

  1. Phicotha yonke iAkhawuntingi, ezeMali, isiGqeba, kunye neBhokisi yemeyile eseMthethweni yeMithetho efihlakeleyo kunye ne-OAuth Apps:
  2. I-ID yoPhicotho-zincwadi / iiLogi zokuNgena kwindawo yokusebenzela zikaGoogle (Impossible Travel kwaye Evilginx AitM Proxy IPs):
    • Jonga iilogi zokungena kwiintsuku ezingama-60 zokugqibela zoqhagamshelo olusuka kwiiVPNs zorhwebo, ii-ASN zababoneleliDigitalOcean, Linode, Stark Industries, M247, Choopa/Vultr, OVH), okanye izixeko ezingaqhelekanga. Ukuba umsebenzisi ebesengozini nangona iMFA yenziwe yasebenza, bacofa i Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing link (Evilginx / Tycoon 2FA). Hlehlisa zonke iithokheni zokuhlaziya (Revoke-MgUserSignInSession) kunye nokuphucula ezeMali/abasebenzi abaLawulayo ukuze babe FIDO2 Hardware Security Keys.
  3. Jonga ukuba iDomain yakho yeDomain yafaniswa na ngeDomain efana neLook:
    • Jonga dnstwist (dnstwister.report) yegama lesizinda senkampani yakho. Ukuba umhlaseli ubhalisa i-domain ebonakalayo efana nembonakalo (efana nokutshintsha unobumba omncinci l ngonobumba abakhulu I, okanye ukubuyisela m nge rn, okanye ukongeza -billing.com), ngenisa ngokukhawuleza imeko engxamisekileyo Isaziso sokuThatha iNgcaciso yoMbhalisi weDomain kumbhalisi wedomeyini ebukekayo kunye nomnikezeli wokubamba (bandakanya i EML iiheader ezibonisa ithambeka lisetyenziselwa ubuqhophololo bocingo olusebenzayo, iirejistra zinqumamisa imimandla esebenzayo ye-BEC yokuxhwaleka kwiiyure xa kubonelelwe ngeeheader).
  4. Ukunyanzeliswa koMthetho oMkhulu wocingo kunye noKhuseleko lwe-ACH (uQinisekiso oluNgaphandle kweBand oluBini):
    • ** Ungaze uqinisekise imiyalelo emitsha okanye etshintshileyo yocingo/i-ACH ngokufowunela inombolo yefowuni eprintwe ngaphakathi kwe-imeyile okanye kwi-invoyisi ye-PDF eqhotyoshelweyo.** Umkhohlisi ubeka inombolo yakhe yefowuni ye-Google Voice / isitshisi kwi-invoyisi ye-PDF yomgunyathi ukuze xa ufowunela "ukuqinisekisa", i-scammer iphendula ifowuni kwaye iqinisekise inombolo ye-routing yobuxoki.
    • Umgaqo-nkqubo oSinyanzelo: Lonke utshintshiselwano ngocingo, useto olutsha lomthengisi, okanye utshintsho kwiinkcukacha zebhanki ezisele zikho ngaphezulu kwe-1,000 yeedola kufuneka ziqinisekiswe ngokufowunela inombolo yefowuni eyaziwayo-elungileyo, efunyenwe kwikhontrakthi yakho yoqobo yomthengisi ongaphandle kwe-intanethi okanye kuluhlu oluzimeleyo loluntu**, KWAYE kufuna Imvume yoLawulo oluBini (umsebenzi omnye usungula igosa lebhanki elizimeleyo; kwaye ikhupha ithokheni yocingo).
  5. Vumela Positive Pay (yeetsheki kunye neACH) kunye neeNkonzo zoQinisekiso lwe-Akhawunti:
    • Layita i-ACH Positive Pay / Debit Blocks kuzo zonke ii-akhawunti zokusebenza zorhwebo ukuze kungabikho mntu wangaphandle unokutsala iidebhithi ze-ACH ezingagunyaziswanga.
    • Xa uthumela iintlawulo e-UK (Confirmation of Payee / CoP), I-EU (IBAN-Name Check igunyaziswe phantsi kwe-EU Instant Payments Regulation), okanye iUS (Early Warning Services / Nacha Account Validation), qinisekisa ukuba igama lomnini-akhawunti elibuyiswe luthungelwano lokucoca liyahambelana negama lenkampani ekujoliswe kulo phambi kokuba ukhuphe imali.

Imibuzo edla ngokubuzwa

What exactly is a bank "Letter of Indemnity" (Hold Harmless Agreement) and why won't the receiving bank return our stolen wire without one?

When your money lands in a scammer's account at a Receiving Bank (for example, Chase, Wells Fargo, or Bank of America), the Receiving Bank faces a legal dilemma: if they unilaterally take $100,000 out of their customer's account and send it back to your bank based solely on an allegation of fraud, and it turns out to be a commercial contract dispute rather than fraud, the account holder could sue the Receiving Bank for wrongful conversion. A **Hold Harmless / Letter of Indemnity (LOI)** is a standardized interbank legal contract signed by your **Originating Bank** and transmitted to the **Receiving Bank**. In the LOI, your Originating Bank legally guarantees that if the Receiving Bank freezes and returns those specific funds, your Originating Bank will indemnify and pay all legal costs if the Receiving Bank is sued over returning the money. Once the Receiving Bank receives a formal LOI from your bank, their legal risk drops to zero, allowing them to release the frozen balance back to your bank.

How long does a wire fraud recall actually take once the receiving bank freezes the money?

Freezing the money is fast (often within **2 to 48 hours** of your bank sending the Recall Request, calling the receiving fraud desk, and filing with the FBI IC3 Recovery Asset Team), **but** physically receiving the returned funds back into your account typically takes **2 to 8 weeks** (and occasionally up to 90 days if law enforcement seizes multiple commingled victims' funds in the same mule account). Why the delay? After the Receiving Bank freezes the scammer's account, their compliance and legal team must complete an internal anti-money-laundering investigation, verify the executed Letter of Indemnity from your bank, confirm no other victims' funds are commingled in the remaining balance, and wait out statutory notice windows before wiring the recovered net funds back to your Originating Bank.

If a hacker broke into our vendor's email and tricked us into wiring our invoice payment to a scammer, do we STILL legally owe the vendor the money?

In the United States and several common-law jurisdictions, courts resolve this painful question using the **"Imposter Rule" / Comparative Negligence standard** drawn from **Uniform Commercial Code `UCC § 3-404`** and federal appellate case law (such as *Beau Townsend Ford v. Don Hinds Ford* and *Arrow Truck Sales v. Top Quality Truck & Equipment*). Generally, a buyer's contractual obligation to pay a vendor is not discharged when money is sent to a third-party imposter, **HOWEVER**, courts systematically examine **which party was in the best position to prevent the fraud and whose negligence caused the breach**. If forensic logs prove that the **Vendor's own email server was hacked** because the vendor failed to use Multi-Factor Authentication, failed to secure their inbox, or knew they were breached and failed to warn customers, courts frequently assign partial or full liability to the negligent party. Preserve all raw email headers (`EML`) immediately and have legal counsel inspect whose system was breached before agreeing to pay the invoice a second time.

Can an ACH transfer be reversed more easily than a Fedwire or SWIFT wire transfer?

It depends entirely on **how fast you catch it**. Unlike a Fedwire transfer (which settles in real time in minutes), standard **ACH transfers** settle in scheduled batch windows (Same-Day ACH windows or Next-Day ACH). If you catch a fraudulent ACH push **before your bank's ACH batch cutoff window closes**, your bank can simply delete the un-transmitted ACH file and you lose $0. However, once an ACH push settles at the Receiving Bank (`RDFI`), **NACHA Operating Rules** only allow automatic unilateral "ACH Reversals" for very specific clerical errors (duplicate payment, wrong dollar amount, or unintended receiver account number within 5 banking days), not simply because you were scammed. Therefore, once a fraudulent ACH settles, you must treat it **identically to a wire fraud**: demand that your bank (`ODFI`) immediately transmit an **ACH Fraud Recall with a Hold Harmless / Letter of Indemnity** to the Receiving Bank (`RDFI`) and file an FBI `ic3.gov` report immediately.

Why didn't the receiving bank stop the wire when the company name I typed on the wire ("ABC Title Co.") didn't match the scammer's personal name on the bank account ("John Smith")?

This shocks almost every victim of wire fraud: in the United States (under **Uniform Commercial Code `UCC § 4A-207(b)`**) and historically across global SWIFT rails, **automated wire processing systems route and credit incoming wires based 100 percent on the numeric Account Number alone, completely ignoring the text written in the "Beneficiary Name" field.** Unless a human employee at the receiving bank happens to manually review the incoming wire before posting and gains *actual knowledge* of the name mismatch, `UCC § 4A-207` explicitly permits banks to rely solely on the account number for automated high-speed clearing. (Note: The UK and the European Union have recently closed this loophole for domestic transfers by mandating automated **Confirmation of Payee / IBAN-Name Verification** checks before a transfer is sent).

What if the scammer told me to wire money to a bank account and then immediately converted it into Cryptocurrency or Gold Bars?

If you wired money into an account controlled by a scammer (or if a scammer coached you into wiring money from your own bank account directly to a cryptocurrency exchange like Coinbase, Kraken, Crypto.com, or a gold bullion dealer), **still initiate the bank recall AND file an FBI `ic3.gov` / Secret Service report immediately.** If the wire went to a domestic bank account before moving to a regulated crypto exchange, the receiving bank and law enforcement can trace the exact outbound transfer to the exchange and issue a law enforcement freeze on the exchange account or blacklist stolen `USDT`/`USDC` stablecoins on-chain (see our guide on [cryptocurrency wallet drain and seed phrase compromise](cryptocurrency-wallet-drain-and-seed-phrase-compromise.md)). Never pay any online "recovery agent" who promises to hack or recover your wire for an upfront fee, 100 percent of non-governmental recovery services are secondary scams.

Imithombo ijongiwe

  • I-Federal Bureau of Investigation (i-FBI, eUnited States): Iziko leSikhalazo soLwaphulo-mthetho kwi-Intanethi (IC3) iQela le-Asethi yoBuyiselo (i-RAT), iProtokholi ye-Financial Kill Kill (FFKC) kunye ne-Business Email Compromise izaziso zeNkonzo kaRhulumente (ic3.gov).
  • Uthungelwano lokuNyanzeliswa koLwaphulo-mthetho lwezeMali (i-FinCEN, iSebe leSebe lezeMali lase-United States): Iingcebiswano malunga neeNgcaciso ze-Imposter kunye ne-Money Mule Schemes / iNkqubo yokuPhendula ngokukhawuleza (RRP) ye-Cross-Border Wire Recalls (fincen.gov).
  • I-Arhente yoKhuseleko lwe-Cybersecurity kunye neZiseko zoKhuseleko (CISA) kunye neNkonzo yaseMfihlo yase-United States (eUnited States): UkuKhusela ngokuchasene nokuChaphazeka kwe-imeyile yoShishino kunye nobuQhophololo ngocingo lweReal Estate (cisa.gov, secretservice.gov).
  • UMlawuli weeNkqubo zeNtlawulo (PSR) kunye noGunyaziwe wokuZiphatha ngokweZimali (FCA, eUnited Kingdom): Ingxelo yoMgaqo-nkqubo PS23/4 & PS24/3: Ukulwa neNtlawulo eGunyaziweyo yokuPhuhliswa kweNtlawulo (i-APP) Ubuqhophololo: IMfuneko yokuBuyiselwa kweMbuyiselo eSinyanzelo kwiiNtlawulo eziKhawulezayo kunye ne-CHAPS (Ukuqala ngo-Oktobha 20, 20) (20)psr.org.uk).
  • I-European Payments Council (EPC, European Union): SEPA Credit Transfer (SCT) kunye neSEPA Instant Credit Transfer (SCT Inst) Rulebooks: Recall for Fraudulent Origin (SCT)FRAD / camt.056) (europeanpaymentscouncil.eu).
  • IKomishoni yoMthetho eFanayo / iZiko loMthetho laseMelika (eUnited States): Ikhowudi yoRhwebo eFanayo (UCC) Inqaku lesi-4A: Uweliselo-mali (§ 4A-207 Ukuchazwa kakubi koMbonelelwa; § 4A-211 Ukurhoxiswa kunye noLungiso loMyalelo weNtlawulo) (uniformlaws.org).

Izikhokelo ezinxulumeneyo