Fa'ato'aga tapuni uaea fa'asese ma fa'alavelave fa'afuase'i toe fa'amanatu le faletupe¶

O le fa'aogaina o lau tupe teu mo le totogiina o le fale, pili fa'apisinisi, po'o le tapunia o le tusi tupe a se tagata solitulafono ona o fa'amatalaga fa'akomepiuta pepelo, o se solitulafono e ta'ua o le Business Email Compromise (BEC) po'o le Real Estate Wire Fraud, e fa'atupu ai se tuuga fa'asaga i le uati fua i minute ma itula. E le pei o kata fai aitalafu po'o aitalafu ACH tagata fa'atau (lea e puipuia e le Tulafono Fa'atonu Z ma le Tulafono E), fe'avea'i Fedwire/CHIPS fa'alotoifale ma fe'avea'i SWIFT fa'avaomalo o lo'o pulea e le Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 4A ma ua fuafuaina mo le fa'ataunu'uina lata mai. O le taimi lava e nofo ai se uaea i le faletupe o loʻo faʻamanuiaina, e vave lava ona taumafai tagata taufaaleaga e salu tupe i totonu o teugatupe i fafo poʻo fefaʻatauaʻiga cryptocurrency.

Ae ui i lea, o le talitonuga lautele o le fesiitaiga o le uaea e 100 pasene le alu i le lona lua e lafo atu e sese. Afai e te faʻatinoina le Golden 24-to-72-Hour Wire Recall ma Interbank Freeze Protocol i le taimi lava lena, tuʻufaʻatasia se faletupe Fedwire/SWIFT toe faʻafoʻi faʻatasi ma faʻamatalaga tuusaʻo i le le mauaina o le faletupe o le fraud department ma le FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) Recovery Asset Team (RAT), feterale faʻafoʻi tupe faʻaola ma le faʻafoʻi tupe faʻatauvaʻa a le feterale o le selau miliona tala faʻatau tupe faʻatau ma le faʻatau tupe a le malo. fa'asese uaea tapuni i tausaga uma. E le gata i lea, i lalo o le UCC Article 4A ma tulafono a le setete o le faatamala, o le faletupe e taliaina, faletupe auina, po o le kamupani fa'aleaganu'u/escrow e mafai ona noatia faaletulafono mo lou leiloa.

Fai nei loa¶

1. Valaau lau Sending Bank's Wire Fraud / Wire Operations Desk VAVATE (Minute 0 i le Minute 15): Aua e te faatali i se laina lautele o tagata faatau pe lafo se imeli. Vala'au lau faletupe tuuto Wire Transfer Operations / Fraud Department (pe tamo'e fa'aletino i le lala lata ane ma fa'atonu le Pule o le Paranesi e vala'au le Potu Uaea i tua a'o e tu ai iina). Fa'aaoga upu sa'o nei: "O a'u o le tagata ua afaina i se fanua fa'afuase'i fa'atauva'a / BEC uaea taufaasese. Ou te mana'omia oe e vave fa'aleaogaina pe toe manatua Fa'amatalaga Uaea/Numera IMAD [Numera] lafo i le aso i le aofa'i o le $[Amount] i le [Receiving Bank Name], Account #[Number]. Tu'u vave ** Fedwire Reversal / SWIFT MT192 / camt.056 Talosaga Fa'aleaogaina* fa'atasi ai ma le Fa'asalaga Fa'amauina le Maliega Fa'aleaga i le taimi nei."*
2. Maua le 18-i-22-karacter Fedwire IMAD / OMAD Su'esu'ega Numera (po'o le 36-karacter SWIFT UETR): Fai atu i le uaea a lau faletupe e faitau sa'o mai le IMAD (Input Message Accountability Data) ma le OMAD (Output Message Accountability Data) numera (mo US domestic wires) po o le **SWIFT Transition a le **SWIFT Uetusi (mo US domestic wires) po o le **SWIFT Transition a le SWIFT. Fa'amatalaga) (mo uaea faavaomalo). Ole numera ole su'esu'e ole si'ilima fa'atekinolosi sa'o lea e mana'omia e le au fa'amalosia tulafono ma le faletupe e mauaina ma fa'aisa lau tinoitupe ile sekone.
3. Va'au sa'o lava i le RECEIVING Bank's Fraud & Wire Department (Minute 15 i le Minute 30): Aua e te faatali mo le feau faaeletonika a lau faletupe e lafo mai e alu atu i le laina. Su'e le numera o le auala (numera ABA) i luga o fa'atonuga o uaea fa'asese e fa'ailoa tonu le ** Beneficiary / Receiving Bank** (mo se fa'ata'ita'iga, Chase, Faletupe o Amerika, Wells Fargo, Citibank, po'o se faletupe fa'aitulagi). Vala'au sa'o le Matagaluega o Fraud a le faletupe, avatu i ai le IMAD/OMAD numera, sa'o le aofa'i o tala, numera o tupe a le tagata e mauaina, ma le faailoga taimi, ma ta'u atu o tupe o lo'o i totonu o lena teuga tupe ua gaoia e maua mai i le fa'a'ole'ole ma mana'omia se Administrative Fraud Freeze / Hold i luga o le teugatupe a le tagata e mauaina.
4. ** Fa'ai se fa'aseā fa'afuase'i ile ic3.gov e fa'aosoina le FBI's "Recovery Asset Team" (RAT) and Financial Fraud Kill Chain (Minute 30 i Minute 60):** Alu loa i le FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center i ic3.gov ma tu'u atu se fa'asea fa'asese uaea fa'afuase'i e lisi ai le Sending Bank, Receiving Bank, Numera Teugatupe, Aofa'i Tala Sa'o, Timestamp, ma le numera IMAD/OMAD. Mo uaea i totonu o aiga (aemaise fanua ma uaea BEC e $50,000 pe sili atu ua lipotia i totonu o le 24 i le 72 itula), o le Recovery Asset Team (RAT) a le FBI e amatalia le Financial Fraud Kill Chain (FFKC) ma le feterale a le faletupe o loo mauaina le feterale e faamalosia le tulafono e mafai ona tuusao le tupe i luma o i latou. O le taimi lava na tu'uina atu ai i ic3.gov, vala'au lau FBI Field Office i le lotoifale i le telefoni, tu'u atu i le sui o le tiute lau IC3 fa'ase'e taimi fa'aulu ma le numera IMAD, ma fai atu ia i latou e fa'atele vave le uaea i le IC3 Recovery Asset Team.
5. Valaau le Title Company, Escrow Officer, poʻo le Real Estate Attorney i le telefoni (faʻaaogaina se numera tutoatasi faʻamaonia): Faʻailoa vave le kamupani igoa, escrow agent, ma le faioloa faʻatau fanua ua faʻafefeteina a latou imeli poʻo le faitotoa o fefaʻatauaiga ma ua liliu lau uaea tapunia. Fa'atonu i latou e fa'asao uma fa'amaumauga imeli, ogalaau su'ega su'etusi a le Microsoft 365 / Google Workspace, ma faiga inisiua cyber/errors-and-omissions (E&O), ma fesili pe mafai ona toe fa'aopoopo le aso e tapunia ai lau konekarate fa'atau a'o fa'agasolo le uaea.
6. Fai se Lipoti a Leoleo Fa'apitonu'u ma fa'asao ulutala imeli mata'utia (.eml / .msg faila): Valaau lau matagaluega leoleo i le lotoifale e maua mai se Numera Ripoti a Leoleo (lea e masani ona manaʻomia e faletupe e mauaina le taofiga o le pulega i tua atu o le 48 itula; mo le lamatiaga faaletino vave, valaau 911 i le US/Kanata, 112 i le EU, 999 i Peretania, pe siaki le matou numera fa'afuase'i). Aua le ** na'o le lafo atu pe fa'amalama le imeli pepelo; la'u mai le ulua'i raw .eml pe .msg imeli faila fa'atasi ai ma ulutala savali i luga ole laiga e fa'aalia ai le tuatusi IP moni a le tagata ta'avale ma tali-i le vaega.

flowchart TD
    Wire["Fa'ailoa le Fa'aliliuina o Uaea na Tu'uina i le Teugatupe a Scammer (Tapuni Fa'asese / Fa'asese BEC)"] --> Min15["Minute 0-15: Call Sending Bank Wire Room | Talosaga Fa'ato'a Fa'aleaogaina po'o Fedwire Recall / SWIFT MT192 + Taofi le Fa'asalaga Fa'aleaga | Maua le numera IMAD/OMAD poʻo le UETR"]
    Min15 --> Min30["Minute 15-30: Su'e i luga ABA Routing # & Vala'au RECEIVING Bank's Fraud Desk sa'o | Tuuina atu IMAD/OMAD & Talosaga Fa'amalo Fa'atonu Fa'atonu i luga ole Teugatupe a le Tagata"]
    Min30 --> Min60["Minute 30-60: Fa'aulu Fa'asea Fa'afuase'i i le FBI ic3.gov MA Valaau le Ofisa FBI Fa'alotoifale e fa'aoso le Vaega o Aseta Toe Fa'aleleia (RAT) Fa'a'ole'ole Tau Tupe Fa'amate filifili."]
    Min60 --> Hour2["Itula 1-4: Valaau Suafa Moni/Kamupani Escrow + Fa'aulu Lipoti a Leoleo Fa'apitonu'u + Fa'asao Ulutala Imeli Mata'utia (.eml/.msg)"]
    Hour2 --> Status{"O le a le Tulaga o Tupe i le Faletupe Talia?"}
    Status -->|Funds Still in Account & Frozen| Return["Saini le Faletupe o lo'o Taofi le Maliega Fa'aleaga / Fa'asalaina & Tuuina atu le Lipoti a Leoleo/FBI ina ia toe fa'afo'i e le Faletupe Fa'atosina Tupe Fa'aaisa"]
    Status -->|Funds Partially Swept to Second Bank / Crypto Exchange| Trace["Fai le FBI RAT / Auaunaga Fa'alilo & Faufautua i luga ole Initaneti e Tu'uina atu Talosaga Fa'afuase'i / Fa'a'aisa ile Faletupe Lua po'o le Fa'atulafonoina o Crypto Exchange (Coinbase/Kraken/Tether)"]
    Status -->|Funds Gone or Recall Refused| Litigate["Su'esu'e Fa'aletulafono I lalo ole UCC § 4A-207 (Igoa-Numera Le fetaui), UCC § 4A-202 (Uea Le Fa'atagaina), po'o le Fa'atamala i Suafa Suafa Kamupani / Realtor."]

E fa'afefea ona toe manatua ma fa'a'aisa uaea va'ava'ai i luga o alavai o totogi o le lalolagi¶

Pe a fai mai se teller o le faletupe "E le mafai ona matou taofia se uaea pe a pe," ua latou fenumiai settlement uaea otometi faatasi ai ma faasesega i le va o faletupe. E ui e le mafai ona e kilikiina le "Tatala" faamau i luga o lau telefoni feaveaʻi pe a maeʻa se Fedwire, o faletupe e fesoʻotaʻi ma isi e faʻaauau pea e ala i faʻasalalauga faʻasalalau i le va o faletupe ua fuafuaina faapitoa e faʻamalo ma toe faʻafoʻi atu uaea taufaasese.

Law enforcement escalation: Activating the FBI IC3 "Recovery Asset Team" (RAT)¶

For wires sent to or from a bank account in the United States, your single strongest ally in the first 72 hours is the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Recovery Asset Team (RAT), operating out of the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ic3.gov).

How the FBI Financial Fraud Kill Chain (FFKC) Works¶

Established in 2018 to combat real estate closing wire fraud and Business Email Compromise, the FBI Recovery Asset Team acts as a direct 24/7 operational bridge between victims, FBI field offices, FinCEN, and the internal fraud-freeze desks of every major US bank ( securing an historical recovery rate exceeding 70 percent on domestic wires caught in time).

To make sure your ic3.gov filing triggers the Financial Fraud Kill Chain immediately rather than sitting in a general inbox, make sure your submission includes these exact seven data points:

• 1. Originator (Victim) Name and Location: Your full name, phone, email, and city/state.
• 2. Sending Financial Institution: Bank name, branch address, routing number, and your account number.
• 3. Beneficiary (Fraudulent) Financial Institution: Exact bank name, bank address, and 9-digit ABA Routing Number (or SWIFT BIC code) from the fake wire instructions.
• 4. Beneficiary Account Details: The Fraudulent Account Number and the Beneficiary Name written on the fake wire instructions.
• 5. Exact Wire Amount and Date/Time Sent: Exact dollar and cent amount (e.g., $142,850.00) and the date/hour the wire settled.
• 6. Fedwire IMAD / OMAD Number or SWIFT UETR: The 18-to-22-character Fedwire tracking number or 36-character SWIFT UETR obtained from your sending bank.
• 7. Call Your Local FBI Field Office Immediately After Submitting: As soon as you click submit on ic3.gov (print/save the confirmation page), look up the telephone number for your nearest FBI Field Office (fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices), call the main switchboard, ask for the Cyber / Financial Crimes Duty Agent, and say: "I just wired $[Amount] in a real estate closing wire fraud [Number] hours ago. I have already filed my complaint on ic3.gov and have the Fedwire IMAD number [Number]. O lo'o ou talosagaina se fa'avavevave i le FBI IC3 Recovery Asset Team (RAT) e amatalia le Financial Fraud Kill Chain ma le [Receiving Bank]."
• Tulaga Fa'amalosia Tulafono Fa'ava-o-malo:
• United Kingdom: Valaau lau faletupe i le 159 (le tulafono a Peretania e tetee atu ai i faiga tau faasese) ma faila se lipoti faanatinati ola taufaavalea ma Action Fraud (actionfraud.police.uk po'o le 0300 123 2040) ina ia mafai ai e le National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) ona tu'uina atu se fa'agata fa'anatinati.
• Kanata: Valaau leoleo i le lotoifale ma lipoti vave i le Canadian Anti-Fraud Center (CAFC, 1-888-495-8501) ma FINTRAC.
• Ausetalia: Lipoti vave e ala i le ReportCyber (cyber.gov.au) ma fa'afeso'ota'i le National Anti-Scam Center (NASC).

Noataga faaletulafono i lalo ole UCC Mataupu 4A ma le Tort Law: E faʻafefea ona toe maua mai lau tupe e tusa lava pe aveese e le gaoi.¶

Ae fa'afefea pe afai ua uma ona tafi ese e le tagata taufaavalea le tupe mai le teuga tupe a le faletupe ae le'i pa'u le malo? Aua e te manatu ua leiloa mea uma. I se fale fa'atau fale po'o fa'asese uaea fa'apisinisi, le tele o fa'alapotopotoga tu'ufa'atasia, le Receiving Bank, le Sending Bank, ma le Title Company / Escrow Agent / Real Estate Broker, e masani ona solia tiute fa'aletulafono po'o tulaga fa'atekonolosi, ma fa'atulafonoina ai latou e toe fa'afo'i tupe.

1. Taofiina le RECEIVING Bank Noataga I lalo ole UCC § 4A-207 (Igoa-ma-Account-Numera Le fetaui)¶

Va'ai toto'a ile fa'atonuga ole uaea pepelo na lafo atu e le tagata fa'akomepiuta ia oe. Ina ia aloese mai le faʻatupulaʻia o masalosaloga, e toetoe lava o taimi uma e taʻu atu ai e tagata taufaaleaga e lisi le Real Title Company's Name (mo se faʻataʻitaʻiga, "Payee Name: First American Title Escrow LLC") i luga o le uaea fomu, aʻo tuʻuina le Scammer's Personal or Shell-Company Checking Account Number (tatala i le igoa o "John Smith" po o *"XYZ LLC).

I lalo o le Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 4A-207 ("Misdescription of Beneficiary"), pe a oo i se poloaiga e totogi ai uaea e iloa ai le tagata e faamanuiaina i le Igoa ma le Numera Teugatupe e faasino i tagata eseese:

• Afai e iai le "Malamalamaga Moni" a le Faletupe o loʻo mauaina (UCC § 4A-207(b)(2)): Afai e faʻagasolo lima e le faletupe o loʻo mauaina le uaea pe iloa foi o le igoa o loʻo i luga o le uaea ("First American Title") e le fetaui ma le igoa o loʻo i luga o le teugatupe ("John Smith"), poʻo pe afai e le mafai e le faletupe o loʻo mauaina ona mulimuli mai / KY-Cus. Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) fu'a mumu ina ua fa'afuase'i ona maua e se teuga tupe fou a le tagata lava ia le $200,000 "title escrow" uaea, leai se tagata e iai le aia tatau e fa'amanuiaina ai ma ua fa'asa fa'aletulafono e le faletupe e talia le totogi o le tagata gaoi ma e tatau ona toe fa'afo'i lau uaea.
• How to investigate: Even though banks automate wire posting so they can claim they did not have "actual knowledge" of the name mismatch at the millisecond the wire landed, banking litigation attorneys subpoena the receiving bank's internal fraud-alert queues. Frequently, the receiving bank's automated fraud software did flag the wire into a human review queue because a $200,000 escrow wire hit a 3-day-old checking account, and a bank compliance employee manually clicked "Approve" despite seeing the name mismatch, which establishes actual knowledge under UCC § 4A-207 and makes the receiving bank 100 percent liable to return your money.

2. Holding the SENDING Bank Liable Under UCC § 4A-202 & § 4A-204 (Unauthorized Wire or Commercially Unreasonable Security)¶

• If a Hacker Logged Into Your Account and Sent the Wire: Under UCC § 4A-202(b) and § 4A-204, if you did not personally authorize the wire, your sending bank must refund your money plus interest unless the bank proves in court that (a) you agreed to a "commercially reasonable security procedure" AND (b) the bank accepted the payment order in good faith and in compliance with that security procedure and your written instructions. If the bank ignored its own anomaly-detection alerts when an unfamiliar IP address wired your entire balance out, the bank bears the loss.
• If It Was a Consumer Wire Initiated via Online Banking: Note that if a third party hacked into your personal consumer checking account to initiate a wire, Regulation E protections may also apply to the unauthorized access step leading to the wire, and state consumer-protection and breach-of-contract claims apply if your bank delayed issuing the Fedwire recall after you reported the fraud.

3. Holding the Title Company, Escrow Officer, Attorney, or Realtor Liable for Negligence (Cyber / E&O Insurance)¶

How did the scammer know the exact day you were closing on your house, the exact dollar amount of your down payment, the property address, and the name of your escrow officer? Because the scammer hacked the email account of your real estate agent, mortgage broker, closing attorney, or title company months earlier and sat silently reading every email thread until closing week.

• Comparative Negligence and Fiduciary Duty Claims: Title companies, real estate closing attorneys, and real estate brokerages carry $1 million to $5 million in Errors & Omissions (E&O) and Cyber Liability Insurance specifically for wire fraud claims. If the title company, law firm, or real estate agent failed to use multi-factor authentication (MFA) on their email accounts, failed to warn you when they noticed suspicious email forwarding rules in their inbox, or transmitted unencrypted closing figures over standard email without a secure portal, real estate wire-fraud attorneys routinely recover 50 percent to 100 percent of the stolen down payment from the negligent professional's E&O / Cyber insurance policy.

Formal Emergency Wire Recall & UCC § 4A-207 Freeze Demand Letter¶

Deliver this written notice immediately via Email, Fax, Secure Portal, and Certified Mail to BOTH your Sending Bank AND the Receiving Bank's Fraud/Legal Department within hours of discovering the wire fraud:

SUBJECT: URGENT WIRE FRAUD RECALL, HOLD HARMLESS DEMAND, AND UCC § 4A-207 ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE NOTICE
Sending Bank: [Your Bank Name] | Sending Account #: [XXXX-1234]
Receiving (Beneficiary) Bank: [Receiving Bank Name] | ABA Routing #: [9-Digit Routing #]
Beneficiary Account Number Credited: [Fraudulent Account #]
Named Beneficiary on Wire Order: [Name You Typed on Wire, e.g., ABC Title Escrow Co.]
Exact Wire Amount: $[Amount] | Date & Time Sent: [Date and Time]
Fedwire IMAD / OMAD Tracking # (or SWIFT UETR): [Insert 18-22 Digit IMAD or 36-Char UETR]
FBI IC3 Complaint Reference: Filed [Date/Time] | Local Police Report #: [Insert Number]

To the Wire Operations, Fraud Prevention, and Legal Compliance Departments of [Sending Bank] and [Receiving Bank]:

1. URGENT NOTICE OF WIRE FRAUD AND DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE ACCOUNT FREEZE:
Please take immediate formal notice that the wire transfer referenced above (IMAD #[Number] in the amount of $[Amount]) was induced by criminal Business Email Compromise / Real Estate Wire Fraud. The funds credited to Account #[Fraudulent Account #] at [Receiving Bank] are stolen proceeds of federal wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343). I demand that [Receiving Bank] place an IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE FREEZE AND HOLD on Account #[Fraudulent Account #] and any linked or secondary accounts to which these funds have been transferred.

2. DEMAND TO SENDING BANK FOR IMMEDIATE FEDWIRE RECALL & HOLD HARMLESS INDEMNITY:
I hereby instruct and demand that [Sending Bank] immediately transmit a formal Fedwire Request for Return of Funds (SVC001 / camt.056) and SWIFT MT192 Cancellation Request to [Receiving Bank], accompanied by a fully executed Interbank Hold Harmless / Letter of Indemnity (LOI) authorizing the immediate return of all frozen funds to my account.

3. FORMAL NOTICE OF NAME-AND-ACCOUNT MISMATCH UNDER UCC § 4A-207:
Please take formal legal notice under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 4A-207 that my wire payment order designated "[Real Title Company Name]" as the intended Beneficiary, whereas Account #[Fraudulent Account #] at [Receiving Bank] is held by an unrelated third party. This correspondence serves as actual written notice to [Receiving Bank] of this misdescription and fraudulent diversion. Any release, withdrawal, or onward transfer of funds permitted by [Receiving Bank] after receipt of this notice, or following any internal fraud/mismatch alert generated at the time of posting, renders [Receiving Bank] strictly liable under UCC § 4A-207.

4. EVIDENCE PRESERVATION NOTICE:
Please preserve all electronic wire logs, IMAD/OMAD messages, internal AML/KYC fraud alerts, manual review queue logs, and account opening records for Account #[Fraudulent Account #] pending law enforcement seizure and civil subpoena.

Sincerely,

[Your Signature]
[Your Printed Name, Phone Number, and Email Address]
Enclosures: Wire Confirmation Receipt (Showing IMAD #), FBI IC3 Filing Confirmation, Local Police Report, and Spoofed Wiring Email

Protecting your real estate contract while your closing funds are frozen¶

When your down payment or closing wire is stolen on the morning of closing, you face a second immediate crisis: defaulting on your Real Estate Purchase Contract and losing the house (or forfeiting your earnest money deposit).

Take these three protective steps on Day 1:

1. Have your real estate attorney or broker serve an immediate "Request for Closing Extension Due to Criminal Wire Fraud": Most sellers will agree to a 7- to 21-day closing extension addendum once shown the FBI IC3 confirmation and bank recall notice, especially if the seller's own title company or listing agent's email was the source of the hack.
2. Never allow the Seller to declare you in default if the Title Company or Seller's Agent was compromised: Under contract law principles of agency and equitable estoppel, if the hacker infiltrated the email system of the Seller's Agent or the Seller-selected Title/Escrow Company to send you the spoofed wire instructions, your real estate litigation attorney can prevent the seller from terminating the contract or keeping your earnest money while the investigation proceeds.
3. Never wire another dollar until you verify instructions via an independent voice phone call: If you have backup funds to complete the closing, never call the phone number printed at the bottom of an emailed PDF wiring sheet (scammers change both the bank routing number and the phone number on the PDF). Look up the title company's phone number independently on Google Maps or your original paper contract, call the escrow officer on the phone, and read the routing and account numbers aloud digit-by-digit.

Fesili e fai soo¶

Punavai ua siaki¶

• Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3, United States): IC3 Recovery Asset Team (RAT) and Financial Fraud Kill Chain (FFKC) Protocol, Business Email Compromise / Real Estate Wire Fraud Public Service Announcements, and IC3 Annual Reports.
• Uniform Law Commission / American Law Institute (United States): Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 4A (Funds Transfers: §§ 4A-202, 4A-203, 4A-204, 4A-207 Misdescription of Beneficiary, and 4A-211 Cancellation and Amendment of Payment Order).
• Fancial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) ma Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (United States): FinCEN Faufautua i Pisinisi Imeli Fa'asea ma Fa'atauga Fa'atau (FIN-2019-A005) ma le CFPB Real Estate Close Scams Consumer Advisory.
• Federal Reserve Financial Services and SWIFT (Global / United States): Fedwire Funds Service Operating Circular 6 (Talosaga mo le Toe Faafo'i Tupe & IMAD/OMAD Tracking) ma *SWIFT Totogi Mu'ai Fa'amaonia & MT192 / ISO 20022 camt.056 Fa'amanatu Tulaga *.
• Faiga Fa'atonu Fa'atonu (PSR) ma le National Cyber ​​Security Center (United Kingdom): PSR Mandatory Authorised Push Payment (APP) Fa'ata'otoga Fa'a'ole'ole Toe Fa'afo'i (CHAPS & Faster Payments) ma le 159 Stop Scams Hotline Protocol.
• Canadian Anti-Fraud Center (CAFC) ma Ausetalia National Anti-Scam Center (Kanata / Ausetalia): BEC ma Meatotino Fa'atonu Fa'asagaga Tali Ta'iala.

Taiala fa'atatau¶

• Fa'aliliuina faletupe e le'i fa'atagaina, Tulafono Fa'atonutonu E fe'ese'esea'iga, ma aia tatau toe totogi
• Fufulu siaki, fa'asese siaki meli gaoia, ma fa'asese siaki tupe pepelo
• Fa'aletonu faletupe, fa'a'aisa fa'amatalaga, ma le toe fa'aleleia o le FDIC
• Fa'asilasilaga fa'amuta, fa'ataga mokesi, ma fa'aitiitia tupe gau
• Fa'aleagaina ma le fa'aleagaina o mea tautupe
• Numera o fa'alavelave fa'afuase'i ile atunu'u